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Summary
This paper evaluates responses to the removal of the retirement earnings test in 2000 for persons at the full retirement age and older. We examine annual earnings and retirement benefit claims from Social Security administrative data that cover the 4 years before and after the change. Three findings emerge from the study.
First, the effect on earnings of removing the earnings test is uneven over the distribution of individuals' earnings. Quantile regression methods show that although the effect on earnings in the lower percentiles is not statistically significant, the effect on earnings in the higher (50 th to 80 th ) percentiles is large and significant. Such a finding
indicates that effects of the removal are limited to earnings levels above the test threshold. The largest increases in earnings are found at the 70 th percentile for persons who have attained ages 65-69 (where earnings increase between $180 and $1,670) and at the 60 th percentile for those turning 65 (where earnings increase between $1,500 and $2,800).
Second, there is no clear evidence of the effect of the test's removal on the labor force participation rate among individuals reaching age 65, whereas work participation among individuals who have attained ages 65-69 increased between 1 and 2 percentage points after the removal. Further analysis indicates that the increase in work participation is mostly attributable to retaining older workers rather than inducing older persons to return to the workforce. The effect appears to increase over the postremoval period,
____________________

Introduction
The retirement earnings test, which has been part of the Social Security Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program since its inception in 1935, has been gradually modified by exempting certain age groups, increasing allowable earnings, and decreasing withholding rates. A rationale for modifications is to encourage older people to work so Although the earnings test compensates individuals for postponing benefit entitlement by increasing their future benefit streams through the delayed retirement credit and automatic benefit recomputation, many people do not view those adjustments as actuarially fair. That is, many people view the earnings test as a tax on earnings above the test threshold, causing both a reduction in work effort (for example, hours of work, earnings, and work participation) of old-age beneficiaries and a delay in applications for
Social Security retirement (old-age) benefits. This tax aspect of the earnings test causes kinks in the budget constraint in a static labor supply model (Burtless and Moffitt 1985, Friedberg 2000) . 2 In the static model, removing the earnings test causes a decline in the marginal tax rate for those who earn above the threshold.
A number of studies have analyzed how incentives generated by Social Security program rules have affected work participation and benefit claims. Those studies relied primarily on cross-sectional variations in benefit amounts as identification information (see Krueger and Meyer (2002) for an overview and survey). In response to the identification problem caused by the fact that all workers face an identical benefit schedule in the Social Security system, the earnings test has drawn attention from economists who seek to investigate the disincentive effect that Social Security program rules have on labor supply. Three recent studies- Friedberg (2000) , Gruber and Orszag (2003) , and Loughran and Haider (2005) -used the experimental approach by noting that modifications of the earnings test in the United States affected some groups but not respectively (Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, 2003 Bulletin, (2004 ). 2 See the Senate debate on the 2000 elimination of the earnings test (http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/ senateret.html). The observation that people bunch at the kink and respond to changes in the earnings test rules has been considered to be a basis for supporting that view (Friedberg 2000) .
others. 3 Although Friedberg's results indicated a small but significant effect of the earnings test on the labor supply of older workers, Gruber and Orszag indicated that the earnings test had no robust influence on labor supply and appeared to accelerate benefit receipt among eligible individuals. Results reported in Haider and Loughran indicated that the earnings test has a substantial impact on hours worked and benefits claimed for men. Disney and Tanner (2002) and Baker and Benjamin (1999) examined the elimination of a similar earnings test in the United Kingdom and Canada. Disney and Tanner reported that the elimination of the earnings test increased hours worked by men in the United Kingdom by about 4 hours per week. Baker and Benjamin found a shift from part-time to full-time work among Canadian men aged 65-69.
Unlike other studies, this study focuses on the most significant single change in the history of the U.S. earnings test. 4 It provides comprehensive empirical evidence on the effects of removing the earnings test for persons aged 65-69 by using a large and accurate Social Security Administration (SSA) administrative data set that covers the period from 4 years before to 4 years following the removal (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . By including 4 years of data after the removal, we are able to investigate reactions not only immediately following the removal but also for several years after. This extended period can help us understand dynamic responses to changes in the relative price of labor among older workers, some of whom face substantial constraints on reentering the labor force because of deteriorating health and outdated skills. Further, by using quantile regression methods, 3 Friedberg investigated three changes in earnings test rules in 1978, 1983, and 1990 . Effects reported in Gruber and Orszag (2000) for 1973 -1998 and in Haider and Loughran (2005 ) for 1975 -2003 are identified by all changes, including gradual increases in the test threshold in each year. See Leonesio (1990) for reviews of and references to early studies on the earnings test. 4 Song (2003 Song ( /2004 
Earnings Test Rules and Theoretical Prediction
The retirement earnings test operates in a relatively simple manner. Social Security benefits are reduced if earnings exceed the threshold amounts, but the reduction in benefits is at least partially offset in the future through the delayed retirement credit and benefit recomputation. 5 Thus, the earnings test has both "tax" and "transfer" features.
The tax feature of the earnings test includes both threshold amounts and withholding rates. The threshold amount varies by the year in which the test applies and by the ages of the beneficiaries. Before the 2000 removal of the earnings test, the thresholds for persons aged 65-69 as of 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999 were $12,500, $13,500, $14,500, and $15,500; for those aged 62-64 they were $8,280, $8,640, $9,120, and $9,600, respectively. The benefit withholding rate was $1 for each $3 of earnings above the earnings test threshold for individuals aged 65-69 and $1 for each $2 for those aged 62-64.
The transfer feature of the earnings test, often overlooked because of the focus on the tax feature, compensates for the withholding of benefits by increasing the primary beneficiary's future benefit stream. Two aspects of the Social Security rules compensate study used innovative data sources, his analysis focused on the initial impact of the removal of the test by covering only the first year following the removal. 5 The benefit recomputation after initial entitlement is not directly associated with the earnings test. However, the benefit recomputation is relevant if eliminating the earnings test affects earnings and if the new earnings are substantially higher than the lowest earnings in the current benefit computation. 
Defining Treatment and Control Groups
The main features of the 2000 change in the earnings test are (1) Thus, defining the control and treatment groups on the basis of age appears to be inconsistent with the rules in 2003. However, the FRA was 65 during the preremoval period considered in this paper. To maintain consistency throughout the study period, we maintain the definition of the control and treatment groups partitioned by age for the rest of this paper. We would expect to detect any anomalies arising from the FRA change by including year-by-year dummies in the analysis rather than one posttreatment dummy. • Group 1-the younger control group, who turn ages 62-64;
• Group 2-the younger treatment group, who turn age 65;
• Group 3-the older treatment group, who have attained ages 65-69;
• Group 4-the older control group, who have attained ages 70-72.
The "treatment" in this study depends on both time and age because earnings test rules are specific to age as well as to calendar year. Thus, we cannot take full advantage of the longitudinal format of the SSA administrative data in defining treatment and control groups. Instead, we arrange the data such that each yearly cross section covers the age range 62-72, as shown in Table 1 . The dependent variables of our study-earnings and labor force participation as well as benefit claims-are functions of the passage of time (aging); different age groups have their own time trends arising from interactions of group-and time-specific effects on the outcome variables. Thus, by defining control groups to include exactly the same age range in each year, our control groups can isolate both age-and year-specific effects. By including both older and younger age groups as control groups, we expect to learn more about the dynamics of labor supply in response to the removal of the earnings test. 
Descriptive Analyses on Work and Retirement Among Workers Aged 62-72
From 1996 through 2003, the data show movements in work participation and benefit entitlement of the treatment groups relative to the control groups ( (those who had attained ages 65-69). During the postremoval period, benefit entitlement rates increased slightly for the two older age groups, but they decreased slightly for the two younger age groups. Work participation rates increased slightly over the study period to the following levels: 55 percent to 56 percent, 45 percent, 31 percent to 32 percent, and 19 percent to 20 percent, respectively. Benefit entitlement rates among those aged 64 or younger tended to fall slightly over the study period, but rates for those aged 65 or older tended to increase slightly over time.
Although the descriptive results show no clear evidence of effects of the earnings test removal on work participation rates, they suggest that benefit entitlement rates for persons turning 65 are somewhat higher after the removal. The magnitude of the increase does not appear to be large, perhaps because most individuals have already become entitled to old-age benefits before they reach age 65.
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The large sample size and the longitudinal format of our data allow us to construct transition matrices so that we can follow persons of a particular age from one year to the In an effort to more closely examine the effects on earnings at different points along the distribution, we look at nominal earnings at the 40 th through 80 th percentiles for those who work over the study period, by age group ( 
Regression Analysis
In this section, we present two sets of reduced-form regression estimates. We estimate the effects on work participation and benefit entitlement using a Probit specification and the effects on the earnings distribution using ordinary least squares (OLS), truncated, and percentile regressions. The regression estimates are based on the difference-in-difference Choosing the specification for evaluating effects on benefit entitlement and work participation is straightforward because observed outcomes are binary, discrete variables.
We use a Probit specification for both binary outcome variables. Choosing the earnings specification is more difficult. Because the earnings of a large fraction of the samples are zero, we need to account for the difference between the censored zero observations and the continuous nonzero observations in estimating the effects on earnings. 24 Although the OLS approach can be useful in measuring the mean effect over the whole sample, it fails to distinguish between censored and noncensored values of earnings. Further, when the dependent variable is censored, OLS estimates over all samples tend to be biased toward zero (Amemiya 1985) . 25 Results based on the Tobit model can be provided on request. We acknowledge that the truncated regression method is also problematic because we are ignoring information in the independent variables for those zero earners. An appropriate approach would be a general Tobit (Type II) that accounts for the twostep process for the labor supply decision that generates observed zero and nonzero earnings (Amemiya regression nor OLS-based estimates are appropriate to capture the uneven impact over the distribution that is predicted by theory. Thus, we use quantile regression methods, where we limit the sample to working individuals (nonzero earners).
The difference-in-difference model presented above relies on two critical assumptions: (1) no contemporaneous shock other than the 2000 earnings test removal has affected the dependent variable of the treatment groups relative to the control groups, and (2) any change in the dependent variable in the absence of the treatment is the same for all groups. Thus, we offer a simple specification test to see whether the estimate of β 
Estimated Effects on Benefit Entitlement
We report estimated effects of the earnings test removal on benefit claims from two separate regressions, one for each treatment group (individuals who have attained ages 65-69 and those who are turning 65) (Table 4) . Model I includes the full set of 1985) . However, one needs to model the work decision separately from the decision about work hours (or earnings). Further, two conditions must hold: (1) the covariance term of the equation for work participation and the equation for earnings level must be zero; (2) at least one variable in the earnings equation cannot be included in the work participation equation (Maddala 1983 ). It is not feasible for us to use the general Tobit specification because the SSA administrative data contain limited information on individuals' characteristics. Therefore, caution is necessary in interpreting truncated regression results and using the estimate for other purposes. 26 Here Δ j 1996 is the omitted interaction dummy. See Angrist and Krueger (1999) for further discussion on the specification test for the difference-in-difference model. (Vroman 1985, Packard 1990, Gruber and 27 The estimated increase in benefit claims of 2.2 percentage points in 2000 following the test's removal is not surprising and appears to be consistent with the result reported in Song (2003 Song ( /2004 . The estimated magnitude of 2 to 5 percentage points may not seem large, but it indicates a substantially large impact on benefit claims among those who had not yet become beneficiaries by age 65. Only 10 percent of those who had attained ages 65-69 had not yet claimed old-age benefits before 2000.
Orszag 2003)
. 28 If such spillover exists, using those who are turning 62-64 as the only control group might cause us to overestimate the effect. Likewise, using those who have attained ages 70-72 as the only control group might cause the effect to be underestimated, because any causal effect on the benefit entitlement of those who have attained ages 65-69 will eventually affect the benefit entitlement of those who have attained ages 70-72. The magnitude of the underestimation is likely to increase over time, because all observations in the current treatment group will eventually enter the control group (those who have attained ages 70-72). Results from Models III and IV are consistent with these speculations. The estimated effects from Model III are all larger than those from Model IV. Estimates from Model III can be considered to be upperbound estimates, and those from Model IV can be considered to be lower-bound estimates.
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Estimated Effects on Work Participation
In Table 5 , we present estimated effects on work participation from four models for each treatment group, as we did in estimating effects on benefit entitlement. Results from
Model II (base model) show that the estimated coefficients for all four treatment dummies are statistically significant for those who have attained ages 65-69 but not for those turning 65. Estimated marginal effects indicate that the work participation rate 28 An individual aged 62-64 who wants to claim benefits may decide to continue working until reaching age 65 rather than to reduce work (or to retire). Similarly, an individual aged 62-64 who works above the earnings test threshold may decide not to claim benefits until reaching age 65. Both types of spillover are likely to occur because of labor market rigidities. Because of older workers' declining health and outdated skill levels, reentry into the labor market would be quite limited for them. 29 Obviously, the presence of such dynamics could undermine the accuracy of our estimates. Since the dynamics work in opposite directions for the older and younger control groups, we attempt to neutralize potential bias by including both control groups in our base model. The dependent variable is work participation status (1, working (earnings > 0); 0, not working (earnings = 0)).
Other covariates included in the regression are a constant, male, race (white), age group dummies (62-64 and 70-72), and calendar-year dummies from 1996 through 2002.
Model I includes the two control groups and false treatment dummies; Model II, the control groups and only true treatment dummies; Model III, the younger control group (62-64) and true treatment dummies; and Model IV, the older control group (70-72) and true treatment dummies. Model II is the base model.
Effects on those who have attained ages 65 -69
Effects on those turning age 65 underestimate the true causal effects. One can also speculate on a spillover effect to a younger age group. If labor market rigidities limit entry into and exit out of the labor force, we expect to see a positive spillover effect on those turning 62-64. However, estimates from Model III contradict this speculation, because the estimates are larger than those from the base model. It seems plausible that the difference in estimates from Models III and IV is not caused by spillover effects but rather by time trends specific to the different age groups.
Estimated Effects on Earnings
We estimate the reduced form, difference-in-difference equation Other covariates included in the regression are a constant, male, race (white), age group dummies (62-64 and 70-72), and calendar-year dummies from 1996 through 2002.
Model I includes the two control groups and false treatment dummies; Model II, the control groups and only true treatment dummies; Model III, the younger control group (62-64) and true treatment dummies; and Model IV, the older control group (70-72) and true treatment dummies. Model II is the base model. -601,195.80 -601,197 .00
Model III Model IV We next estimate the models using nominal earnings (in thousands of dollars) as the dependent variable using both OLS and quantile regression methods to capture the change in actual earnings (Table 7) . 31 Estimates based on OLS are small and not 30 As was true for the estimates for benefit claims and work participation, we found similar results if one or the other of the control groups was used. 31 We also estimated effects on earnings from a semi-log specification of the difference-in-difference percentile regression over samples with nonzero earnings. Those estimates can be interpreted as the percentage change in earnings at specific points along the earnings distribution after the test was removed. We do not include these results in the paper, but they can be provided on request. In this paper, we report 2000-2003 were $27,825, $28,564, $30,200, and $31,986, respectively. (See Table 3 for other percentile values.) $25,000, $30,000, and $30,720, respectively. Thus, those percentiles where the effects are significant correspond to the earnings test threshold for those attaining age 65.
To summarize, a conventional mean-based evaluation fails to detect the effect of the earnings test removal on earnings. A significant effect on a relatively small fraction of the sample could be overlooked if we were to focus on mean effects only (Heckman, Smith, and Clements 1997) . But by analyzing the effects over different percentiles of the earnings distribution, this study finds statistically significant effects of the test's removal in a way that is exactly predicted by economic theory.
In both treatment groups, we found small and sometimes negative estimates for the 90 th percentile, suggesting the presence of income effects. However, examining the income effect using quantile regression on earnings alone seems inappropriate because the upper threshold, where all benefits are withheld, depends on (family) benefit amounts and not just the primary worker's earnings. Even at the 90 th percentile, earnings of those who have very high benefit amounts would be affected not only by the income effect but also by the substitution effect. Thus, estimated effects on high earnings quantiles would imprecisely measure the income effect. The income effects could be precisely measured by responses in earnings among those who earn above the upper threshold. Thus, our small and statistically insignificant effects at the 90 th percentile are not surprising.
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Lastly, we estimate quantile regressions by including interaction dummies for 1997-2003 and plot point estimates of those effects by year and percentile (Chart 5).
37 36 We are currently undertaking a follow-up study to investigate the income effect using a different empirical framework. 37 Results for logged earnings can be provided on request.
The chart shows (1) how the earnings distributions of the treatment groups have evolved since 1996 after controlling for both time and group effects and (2) 
Ideas for Future Research
The results shown in this paper apply specifically to a change in the retirement earnings test, but the response to changes in thresholds may generalize to other policies. For example, the amount that Disability Insurance beneficiaries can earn without losing benefits, known as the substantial gainful activity (SGA) limit, increased from $500 per month during the 1990s to $700 per month in July 1999. On January 1, 2001, the SGA limit became $740 per month and was indexed to average wage growth. We might expect to find increased earnings among persons close to the threshold after the increase in the SGA, just as we found increased earnings among persons close to the earnings test threshold for whom the earnings test was relaxed or eliminated.
We have several ideas for future research. First, we would like to explore the work activities and claiming behavior of women in response to the removal of the earnings test separately from that of men. Second, the behavior of high-income beneficiaries in response to the removal of the earnings test might be worth further exploration. Those workers received a windfall when the earnings test was eliminated, but it appears from our results that they did not change their earnings or the timing of benefit claims much, perhaps because of reasons we discussed earlier in the paper. Such a result could also be caused by small sample sizes in the top end of the earnings distribution of high-income workers, or it might be the result of some as yet unexplored factors. Third, policymakers are interested in the net programmatic cost or gain to the Social Security system that arises from three sources: the loss of revenue following the elimination of the earnings test, higher payroll taxes coming from older workers who earn more, and accelerated benefit claims. Estimating both an annual cost and a long-term cost would be informative. Fourth, we would like to expand our analyses of spillover effects among persons who are younger than the FRA.
